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Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia, specifically in Indonesia, was very short 
compared to the Western colonialism in the region. It was only about three and half 
years, 1942-1945. However, many scholars have studied the period and a number of 
books and articles have been produced. Almost all of them note the importance of the 
short period in changing socio-political condition of the occupied areas. Some argue 
that, despite its short time, Japanese occupation was a watershed for the history of 
Southeast Asian countries.1 
 The propaganda of Japan when she landed to the region was to build “the 
Greater East Asia,” and “Co-Prosperity Sphere.” To realize that, Japan tried to win 
support from as many population as possible in the occupied territory, so that she 
cooperated with those who really had influence on the grass-root level with the 
objective that mobilization would be successful. Japan was in need of natural and 
human resources for war purposes. In Indonesia, more precisely in Java, Japan used 
ulama or kiyai (religious leaders/scholars) as her main agents of the propaganda. This 
is why the term “Islamic policy” is usually used by scholars who study the Japanese 
occupation in the region. 
 Harry J. Benda2  and C.A.O van Nieuwenhuijze 3  are two scholars who 
specifically discuss the Islamic policy, though the earlier deals the topic in a book 
while the latter in a chapter. Abdul Aziz4 dedicates also a chapter of his book on the 
Islamic policy while Kobayashi Yasuko writes an article on the similar issue.5 Aiko 
Kurasawa, who studies various aspects of mobilization and control in Java by the 
Japanese military administration, contributes a very significant insight on the Islamic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alfred McCoy, ed. Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven: Yale University 
Press, 1980).  
2 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 
1942-1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958). Another article, which discusses the early period 
of Japanese occupation by Benda is "The Beginning of the Japanese Occupation," The Far Eastern 
Quarterly 15 (1956).  
3 C.A.O van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 
1958), 109-60. The chapter entitles “Japanese Islam Policy in Java 1942-1945.” 
4 A Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955).  
5 Yasuko Kobayashi, "Kyai and Japanese Military," Studia Islamika 4, no. 3 (1997).  
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policy by discussing training for kiyai.6 In addition to those who deal with the 
Islamic policy, there are scholars who analyze general issues of the Japanese 
occupation in Indonesia, such as Willard H. Elsbree,7 George Kanahele,8 and Shigeru 
Sato.9 Three articles on aspects of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia have been 
written by three different scholars, Anthony Reid,10 Elly Touwen-Bouwsma,11 and 
A.B. Lapian.12  
 This article will discuss how the Japanese “Islamic policy" has been 
discussed by scholars. To what extent do they differ in interpreting its significance in 
elevating political roles of Muslim elites and its difference from similar policy of the 
Dutch colonial power? How do they view the effect of the policy to the nationalist 
movement, precisely the independence, of Indonesia? To begin with, I will explain 
the term Islamic policy by discussing three related Japanese policies of the 
establishment of Shumubu-Shumuka, Masyumi, and the training for ulama. 
1.  The Islamic Policy 
This term does not means a policy which is Islamic but it refers to a Japanese policy 
in winning Muslims’ support in Java. Muslims are majority population in the island 
and Japan knew that those who had strong influence on the grass-root level were not 
political figures but religious leaders. Therefore, the Japanese government tried to 
keep the loyalty of Muslim figures by providing more concession to them than that to 
other groups, such as nationalists and priyayi (autochthonous aristocrats). Three 
aspects of the Islamic policy, which have been discussed by scholars are Shumubu-
Shumuka (Office of Religious Affairs, central and residential levels), Masyumi 
(Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), 
and training for ulama.13  
 Benda points out that before coming to the Islamic policy, Japan experienced 
a “trial and error” period. He uses this term to show a period between March 1942 
and the end of the year, when the Japanese military government took inconsistent 
actions. While Japan was committed to winning support from Muslims, she took 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Aiko Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control: A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945" 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1988).  
7 Willard Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 1940-1945 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953).  
8 George Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation of Indonesia" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 
1967).  
9 Shigeru Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).  
10 Anthony Reid, "Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword," in Southeast Asia under Japanese 
Occupation, ed. Alfred McCoy (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1980).  
11 Elly Touwen-Bouwsma, "The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese ‘Liberation’ of Indonesia: 
Visions and Reactions," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (1996).  
12 A.B. Lapian, "Personal Reflection on the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia," Southeast Asian 
Sudies 34, no. 1 (1996).  
13 These three topics are discussed by Benda, Nieuwenhuijze, and Kurasawa though the portion of 
each issue discussed is different from one author to the other.  
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several actions, which disappointed them. For examples, it banned all foreign 
languages including Arabic from being taught in schools, it detained K.H. Hasyim 
Asy’ari, a very prominent ulama and the supreme leader of the Nahdatul 
Ulama(NU)—the largest traditionalist Muslim organization—and it required all 
people to do saikeire, bowing in the direction of the imperial palace, which 
resembles the act of rukūʻ (bowing, with two alms touching the knees) in Islamic 
prayer (ṣalāt).14 During the period, the military government also cooperated with 
Muslim political leaders, such as Abikusno and Wondoamiseno. After the 
government realized that these actions were contradictory to the grand strategy of 
winning support from majority of Javanese, it lifted them. 
 It is only Benda who categorizes this period as the trial and error. Yasuko, 
though mentions about the ridiculous actions, does not use the term. She only argues 
that this is because “the Japanese army did not have any concrete plans to carry out 
although the importance of an Islamic policy was fully recognized.”15 Aziz states that 
“Japan began by committing many serious mistakes,”16 without elucidating further 
what he means with serious mistakes. Nieuwenhuijze, on the contrary, does not 
mention these inconsistencies. His article implies that Japan had already had a 
decisive plan from the early period. “Within the first six months of their arrival, the 
Japanese were getting Java ready for an active policy that was to make its population 
prepared to contribute their share to the Japanese war effort. Propaganda, both 
religious and otherwise, was duly prepared.”17 Now, let’s see more detail each part of 
the Islamic policy and discuss how the scholars view them. 
1.1  Shumubu-Shumuka 
Shumubu or the Central Office of Religious Affairs is apparently the most important 
institution in implementing the Islamic policy. It was a part of the Japanese military 
government and existed not long after Japan landed in Java, March 1942. Headed for 
the first time by Colonel Horie, Shumubu propagated actively the presence of Japan 
and the goal of creating “Greater East Asia.” Colonel Horie visited mosques, met 
Muslim leaders, and received visits from them. During the early months, Horie relied 
on Muslim political leaders, such as Abikusno, in making contact with the Muslim 
figures. The most important meeting was when Horie, facilitated by Abikusno, met 
ulama in several cities in Central and East Java, in May 1942. The tour was very 
significant because Japan realized that Muslim leaders who had real influence over 
the mass were ulama and not political figures. With this journey, Japan had a direct 
access to ulama at grass-root level. According to Benda, this tour was a turning point 
after which the role of political leaders decreased.18 In December 1942, without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Benda, The Crescent, 124-27 and 233 (note 22).  
15 Kobayashi, "Kyai and Japanese," 76. 
16 Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism, 194.  
17 Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, 122. 
18 Benda, The Crescent, 113. 
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involving them, Shumubu arranged a meeting between 32 Muslim leaders from Java 
and Gunseikan (the head of the military administration), Let. Gen. Okazaki. The 
significant role of ulama was also confirmed by the chief commander during the 
meeting.19 
 Shumubu was a symbol of how the military government gave concession to 
Islamic leaders, when this department became the first and the only office of the 
Gunseikanbu which was headed by a native Indonesian.20 In September 1943 this 
office was headed by Prof. Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, and in August 1944 he was 
replaced by K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari. At the same, the military government also 
appointed Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, a leader of Muhammadiyah, as the Vice-
Chairman, and A. Wahid Hasyim, the son of Hasyim Asy’ari, as the Advisor of 
Shumubu. In addition, among four sections of this office, two of them were also 
headed by the Muslim figures.21  
Some scholars, however, argue that the appointment of ulama in such high 
rank position of Shumubu was purely political in order to maximize mobilization of 
Muslim people for supporting Japanese war purposes. Nieuwenhuijze, for example, 
contends that the Indonesians in Shumubu “would automatically serve as buffers,”22 
for they had to intensify contact with the public. Aziz, on the other hand, perceives 
the appointment of Hasyim Asy’ari as symbolic because he kept living in Jombang, 
East Java, and almost never came to the office. “His [Asy’ari] investiture was purely 
a symbolic one. The Japanese merely wanted to connect the name of this old 
influential person with the military government,” says Aziz.23 Benda also has similar 
opinion to that of Aziz’s, though he insists that the symbol remained important 
because Asy’ari’s son, Wahid Hasyim, together with Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, 
“assumed top ranking positions in the reorganized Shumubu.”24 Similar to Benda, 
Kurasawa argues that the government regarded Asy’ari “as indispensable and 
considered it advisable to take advantage of the great influence and prestige of this 
old kiyai.” 25  His appointment, according to Kurasawa, was nevertheless 
“enthusiastically welcomed by the Muslim population.”26 Kurasawa further explains 
that the appointment was the Japan’s concession to Muslims and “should not be 
regarded as an inevitable outcome of Japanese favoritism to Muslims.”27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 119; Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, 142-43; Kobayashi, "Kyai and Japanese," 83. 
20 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 390. 
21 The section dealing with Islam and the management was held by K.H. Adnan, and the section 
responsible for propagandas, trainings, and periodical publication was entrusted to K.H. Imam 
Zarkasyi, the founders of the Modern Pesantren Gontor, Ponorogo. Ibid., 398-99.  
22 Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, 158. 
23 Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism, 207. 
24 Benda, The Crescent, 166. 
25 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 396. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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The Japanese military government added more concessions to ulama when it 
decided to establish branch offices of Shumubu in all residencies in Java. The office, 
called Shumuka, was headed by local prominent ulama. With this office, ulama 
overshadowed penghulu (Muslim government officials) who were in charge of 
Islamic affairs during the Dutch colonialism. Penghulu were even under the control 
of ulama. Almost all scholars agree that, at least until mid 1944, through Shumubu 
and Shumuka, ulama enjoyed privileges from Japan at the expense of nationalist and 
priyayi groups.28 
 Despite the important role of Shumubu in the Japanese political Islam, a 
Dutch scholar, Nieuwenhuijze argues that this institution was “the successor of the 
pre-war Kantor voor Inlandse Zaken (Office of Indigenous Affairs).” 29  The 
difference between the two institutions, in his view, was that while the Kantoor 
“worked along scholarly lines,” as it was headed by an “arabists and islmologist,”30 
Shumubu was “meant for action, directed towards the general public.”31 In other 
words, the Kantoor devoted to study “the Indonesian sphere of line and the 
Indonesian Muslim community,”32 while Shumubu “could not afford to stay behind 
the scene, neither could it restrict its work to observation.”33 On the contrary, a 
Japanese scholar, Kurasawa, though acknowledges similarities between the two 
institutes, emphasizes argument that Shumubu represented high attention of the 
Japanese government toward religious affairs. Even in Japan, such institution did not 
exist; religious affairs were handled by the Department of Education. “It is all the 
more significant that the administration of religious affairs was given such 
unprecedented attention, and this shows how sincerely the Japanese authorities were 
trying to deal with Islamic affairs in Java,” says Kurasawa.34 It seems that Kurasawa 
stresses the importance of the office under the Japanese authorities and its difference 
from that under the Dutch colonial government.  
1.2  Masyumi 
Shumubu played significant role in establishing Masyumi.  In November 1943, on 
behalf of the military government, Shumubu dissolved Majelis Islam A’la Indonesia 
(MIAI, the Highest Council of Indonesian Islam) and established Majelis Syuro 
Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). 
The MIAI was established by a coalition of Muslim organizations in 1937 and 
functioned as uniting all potential powers in opposing the Dutch colonialism. The 
non-cooperative with the colonial authority was, therefore, one of the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Benda, The Crescent, 168; Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 383-84; Nieuwenhuijze, 
Aspects of Islam, 143. 
29 Aspects of Islam, 116.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid., 117. 
32 Ibid., 116.  
33 Ibid., 117. 
34 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 384-85. 
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significant characters of this group. Japan tried to dissolve this organization by 
creating Persiapan Persatuan Umat Islam (PPUI, the Preparation for Union of 
Muslims) which was headed by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. However, during the 
meeting attended by Islamic leaders and figures on September 4, 1942, Muslim 
leaders defended the existence of MIAI and elected Wondoamiseno as the new 
leader. The military government had no choice but to accept this decision after it 
required four Japanese sit in the advisory board. Later on, the government found that 
anti-colonial sentiment was still persistent in the organization. This view is based on 
initiative of the MIAI in establishing Baitul Mal (Ar. Bayt al-māl, Islamic treasury) 
in several cities without seeking approval from the government. Therefore, the 
dissolution of MIAI by the Japanese authorities, according to most scholars, was due 
to wariness of the government on the non-cooperative character which in the future 
might turn into anti-Japanese one. 35  Another reason of dissolution of MIAI, 
according to Nieuwenhuijze and Aziz, was the fact that NU and Muhammadiyah (the 
modernist Muslim association) stayed outside the organization, while Japan saw both 
as the most influential groups at grass-root level.36 
 Since the establishment of Masyumi was facilitated by the government, 
Benda suggests that it “enjoyed from its very inception far greater official 
prestige,”37 than MIAI. While MIAI only had one office in Jakarta, Masyumi’s 
branches spread out all over the island. Japan was not worried anymore of this group 
being anti-Japanese since its main objectives were “aiding Dai Nippon in the 
interests of Greater East Asia,” in addition to strengthening unity of all Muslim 
organizations.38 However, in the view of Benda, this institution was no longer a 
social organization, but became “part of the government itself.”39 In Aziz’s term, 
Masyumi was “a semi government organization.”40 
1.3  Training for Ulama 
Almost all scholars agree that training (latihan) for ulama was the most important 
program conducted by the military authorities during occupation. The importance 
took place in its regularity, number of participants, and its long term implementation. 
The training was conducted monthly, from July 1943 until June 1945, except during 
the Islamic fasting month (Ramadhan), totaling 17 times. During first few months it 
ran for four weeks but since February 1944 it reduced into three week. Each month 
the training was attended by about sixty ulama from all residencies in Java. The total 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  Benda, The Crescent, 144-49; Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, 144-53; Aziz, Japan’s 
Colonialism, 205.  
36 Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, 154-55; Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism, 205. 
37 Benda, The Crescent, 152. 
38 Ibid., 150. 
39 Ibid., 166. 
40 Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism, 207. 
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number of participants was, therefore, about 1,020 ulama. This figure, according to 
Kurasawa, was equal to 5.5% of all registered ulama in Java at the time.41 
The objectives of the training, as stated by Shumubucho (the head office of 
Shumubu), Col. Horie when he addressed the participants at the opening ceremony of 
the first training, were “to strengthen [your] understanding of the world situation, and 
to increase your spirit so that you will be able to give the fullest possible support to 
the government.”42 For Japanese, the second purpose was certainly more important. 
Therefore, for Aziz, the training was “mainly designed to indoctrinate Japanese 
ideology.”43 This is so because, as Aziz says, “every course ended with a final 
recapitulation and pledge of loyalty to Japan.”44 Benda argues that this training was 
“ultimately and lastingly to politicize Indonesian Islam at the village level far beyond 
its pre-occupation level.”45 
 Now let us examine the analysis of scholars in regards to the Japanese Islamic 
policy in general. According to Benda, privileging Muslims at the expense of priyayi 
and, to some extent, nationalist groups, was part of “divide-and-rule” policy.46 This 
term reminds us to the well known policy of the Dutch colonialism, divide et impera. 
In fact, Benda acknowledges his indebtedness to a Dutch scholar, Nieuwenhuijze, 
who have suggested him to use this analysis,47 though the latter himself does not use 
this analysis in his article. Benda argues that by the Islamic policy, Japan created 
new elite groups of Muslims in order to check nationalist figures.48 Although Muslim 
leaders had “a greater measure of inherent strength than the other groups,” according 
to Benda, “they owed much of their newly-won position to the occupying power.”49 
By the policy, Japan continued and deepened the division between the Islamic and 
the nationalist elites, a policy which had been hitherto well implemented by the 
Dutch authorities.50  
 Benda’s analysis is criticized by a Japanese scholar, Kurasawa. Although 
both of them studied at Cornell and both initially wrote this topic for Ph.D. 
dissertation, Kurasawa’s conclusion is in opposition to that of Benda. Kurasawa 
contends that Japan tried to unite Indonesians in order to proceed with the war. In 
addition, priyayi’s role in the administration, according to Kurasawa, was not 
replaced by Islamic groups. Kurasawa provides interesting facts to support her ideas. 
In Shumuka, for example, she found that not all of this institution was headed by 
ulama. Some of them were chaired by former penghulu or even those who had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 415-16. 
42 Benda, The Crescent, 135. 
43 Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism, 202. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Benda, The Crescent, 135. 
46 Ibid., 156, 70, 73-74, 76. 
47 Ibid., 275 (note 2). 
48 Ibid., 156. 
49 Ibid., 173. 
50 Ibid., 176. 
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priyayi background.51 In practice, Shumuka did not necessarily have control over the 
penghulu as defined formally by Shumubu. Based on the field interview, Kurasawa 
concludes that “the management of daily Islamic affairs was still left in the hands of 
the penghlu’s office without any limitation of their power.”52 For the training of 
ulama, Kurasawa shows that the participants were not solely ulama in common 
understandings, i.e. old people, having no formal education background, working 
independently so receiving no monthly salary, and not priyayi. She finds that many 
of the participants enjoyed formal education of elementary schools; about 63% were 
under 40 years old; about 23% had permanent job—either in governmental or private 
institutions—and received monthly remuneration. Some of them were also 
penghulu.53 By these data, Kurasawa implies that Japan did not strictly limit the 
target of the policy to the so-called kiyai. Therefore, Benda’s contention that Japan 
implemented divide et impera policy, according to Kurasawa, has no solid bases.  
 Similar to Kurasawa, Shigeru Sato, a Japanese scholar who studies the impact 
of the occupation on the economic and physical welfare of the peasantry of Java, also 
rejected Benda’s analysis of the “divide and rule” strategy. On the contrary, Sato 
argues that to “unite and mobilize” was the predominant theme of the Japanese 
policy throughout the occupation.54 He also argues that compared to the Islamic 
leaders and nationalists, priyayi “played the most important and indispensable roles 
in the military administration.”55 Furthermore, he insists that the role of Islamic 
leaders “in the formulation and implementation of the occupation policies was 
particularistic and marginal.”56 
 Another Japanese scholar, Kobayashi Yasuko, offers a different way to make 
the Japanese Islamic policy sound less negative. She shows that concessions given to 
Muslim groups were basically suggested by Muslims themselves. Yasuko provides a 
historical document which enlisted 98 requests proposed by Muslims to the military 
government during 1942 and until March 1943.57 Yasuko also argues that the policy 
mutually benefited both Japanese and Indonesian Muslims. “Islamic leaders tried to 
take advantage of the opportunities,” for their own agenda and purposes. 58 Many of 
them assumed considerable political power during and after the occupation because 
of the Islamic policy. “The seeds of the changing role of kyais were firstly planted in 
the Japanese occupation policy.”59 She gives an example of Wahid Hasyim, father of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," 406-08. 
52 Ibid., 404. 
53 Ibid., 432-45.  
54 Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, 231. 
55 Ibid., ix. 
56 Ibid., x. 
57 Kobayashi, "Kyai and Japanese," 85. 
58 Ibid., 92. 
59 Ibid., 93. 
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the fourth president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid.60 In short, Yasuko says, 
Muslim leaders “took independent action beyond Japanese expectations.”61 
 The historiography of the Japanese Islamic policy shows that there are, at 
least, two different and, to some extent, opposing interpretations proposed by 
scholars who have studied the policy. Non-Japanese experts tend to be very critical 
to the policy while Japanese scholars, despite their critical, tried to explain why the 
Japanese authorities took certain actions and what impacts, especially the positive 
ones, of the policy were. This difference is apparently influenced by the availability 
and absence of the scholars’ attachment to Japan. In addition, the time lag might also 
contribute to the differences. Benda, Nieuwenhuijze, and Aziz did their research in 
the 1950s62 while Kurasawa, Sato, and Yasuko conducted the research in the 1980s 
and 1990s.63 It is obvious that the latter scholars found historical documents which 
were inaccessible in the earlier periods.  
2.  Studies on Impacts of the Japanese Occupation  
Now let us discuss scholars’ perception on the impacts of the Japanese occupation in 
Indonesia. Elsbree who examines the development of nationalism in Indonesia 
concludes that nationalism was stronger and more developed than the Japanese 
imagined. Nationalists also demanded greater concession than the Japanese 
anticipated.64 However he argues that Japanese policy was not the only cause for the 
development of nationalism. “In part, it was the result of the general situation,”65 
 Similar to Elsbree, Kanahele also studies nationalist movement during the 
Japanese occupation. Kanahele argues that the Japanese interregnum of three and 
half years “determined the direction and tempo of the nationalist movement toward 
the post-war revolution.”66 According to Kanahele, nationalists were the primary 
beneficiaries of more concessions granted by the Japanese authorities in the final 
year of occupation, so that the nationalists were able to strengthen their positions and 
increase their demands.67 “The Japanese occupation had so brought the nationalist 
forces to threshold of power that when the war abruptly ended on August 15, they 
emerged as the vanguard ready to assume control in the vacuum created by the 
surrender. In three and a half years the nationalists ascended from an outlawed 
movement to the threshold of nation-hood.”68  
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61 Ibid., 92. 
62 Benda’s and Nieuwinhuijze’s books were published in 1958, while Aziz’s in 1955. 
63 Kurasawa finished her thesis in 1988, Sato’s book was published in 1994 and Yasuko’s article 
appeared in 1997. 
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 Touwen-Bouwsma examines a slight different topic of nationalism. She 
focuses on the nationalist movement in early few months of the Japanese occupation. 
She contends that during the period, nationalists felt badly betrayed by the Japanese 
because their aspiration of independence was completely crushed by Japan.69 “The 
nationalists were expelled from the rural areas in Java and the Japanese kept a close 
eye on them to make sure that they did not have a chance to maintain contact with 
the common people”70 In comparing between the Dutch colonialism and the Japanese 
occupation, Reid, similar to Kanahele, concludes that “The Japanese occupation had 
a major impact on the subsequent shape of Indonesia.”71 According to Reid, the 
Japanese military administration “armed Indonesians to resist successfully the re-
imposition of the prewar regime, it witnessed the consolidation of Indonesian unity 
and identity, and it encouraged the emergence on the one hand of a new military 
elite, and on the other of a political leadership which was stronger on charisma and 
rhetoric than on political organization and cadre formation.”72 
 An Indonesian historian, A.B. Lapian provides different conclusion when he 
discusses the proclamation of Indonesian independence. According to him, it was “an 
entirely Indonesian affair. The Japanese occupation government—apart from some 
individual sympathizers—was an aloof outsider.”73 He supports his opinion by 
arguing that there was no official intention of the Japanese government to grant the 
Indonesians political freedom. However, he appreciates the Japanese occupation for 
several reasons. “It put an end to Dutch rule in the first place. It provided an 
opportunity for the people to foster feelings of solidarity in times of hardship, 
nourish their national identity, and gather self confidence to determine their own 
future.”74 
CONCLUSION 
The three and half years of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia is certainly a 
significant period of the Indonesian history. Many scholars share a viewpoint that 
radical changes took place during that time, affecting on either nationalist or Islamic 
groups. However, they differ in explaining the details as well as how and to what 
extent the changes had impacted on political affairs of Indonesia. Some scholars, 
such as Benda and Aziz, view the Islamic policy as similar to that of devide at 
empera of the Dutch colonial authorities. Others, such as Kurasawa and Sato see it as 
a policy of uniting potentials of indigenous people. The availability and accessibility 
of historical sources as well as topics of interest seem to be important factors for the 
diverse opinion of the scholars. However personal subjectivity of the scholars is also 
another reason that affects the dissimilarities. This is obvious, especially, for the 	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cases of the Japanese and Indonesian scholars who provide more glorious attempts 
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